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I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 1986, the Chicago City Council, exercising its
home rule power, passed an ordinance (the "Ordinance") which
established the City of Chicago (the "City") as a nuclear weapon
free zone.' The Ordinance is designed to phase out over two years
all nuclear weapon-related activities by private parties within Chicago. While a growing number of communities have adopted nuclear weapon free zone resolutions and ordinances, Chicago is the
largest city in the United States that has thus far enacted an ordi* This Article is a revised version of an opinion letter prepared by the Chicago law
firm of Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd. for the Metro Chicago Chapter of Clergy
and Laity Concerned. The authors would like to acknowledge the support of their
colleagues at Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd. and the assistance of Ron Freund and
John Brokopp of Clergy and Laity Concerned.
** Partner, Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd.; A.B., Oberlin College, 1956; J.D.,
John Marshall, 1964.
*** Partner, Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd.; B.A., New College, 1967; J.D.,
IIT/ Chicago-Kent, 1978.
****
Partner, Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd.; B.A., University of Chicago,
1978; J.D., Georgetown University, 1982.
*****
Partner, Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd.; B.A., Carelton College, 1971;
M.A., Northwestern University, 1975; Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1980; J.D., University of Chicago, 1982.
******
Associate, Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd.; B.A., Georgetown University, 1975; M.A., University of Virginia, 1978; J.D., University of Virginia, 1984.
*******
Associate, Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd.; B.A., University of Chicago, 1978; J.D., Northwestern University, 1983.
1. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202 (1986). See the Appendix, infra, for
the text of the Ordinance. The Ordinance was introduced to the Chicago City Council on
January 14, 1986 with Aldermen David Orr and Bernard Hansen as co-sponsors. It was
assigned to the City Council's Economic Development Committee, chaired by Alderman
Hansen. The first round of committee hearings was held on February 26, 1986. On
motion of Alderman Hansen, the Ordinance was passed by the full City Council on
March 12, 1986 by a viva voce vote.
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nance outlawing private nuclear weapon-related activities.2
The purpose of this article is to assess the legality of Chicago's
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Ordinance. The article first will survey the most salient provisions of the Ordinance.' It then will consider whether the Ordinance (1) is a proper exercise of home rule
power,4 (2) is preempted by state5 or federal law,6 (3) interferes
with interstate commerce, 7 (4) conflicts with the federal war powers,' (5) infringes on first amendment rights, 9 or (6) is a taking
without just compensation.' 0 The article will conclude that the Ordinance is not in conflict with either the Illinois or United States
constitutions or state and federal laws enacted thereunder.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORDINANCE

A.

Purposes of the Ordinance

The preamble of the Ordinance sets out in eleven clauses the
reasons for its enactment. The first clause makes it clear that the
Ordinance is an exercise of the City's police power based on a finding that "the presence of nuclear weapons facilities within Chicago
is in direct conflict with the maintenance of the community's public health, safety, morals, economic well-being, and general
welfare.,""I
While the Ordinance must be understood as having been
prompted by the combined weight of various police power con2. As of November 1985, 105 communities in the United States, with a total population of about 11,000,000, had adopted nuclear weapon free zone ordinances or resolutions. Prior to passage of the Chicago Ordinance, Jersey City, N.J., with a population of
about 250,000, was the largest city in the United States to have adopted a nuclear weapon
free zone ordinance.
Two thousand, eight hundred and forty communities in 17 other countries have declared themselves nuclear weapon free zones. There are also 17 nuclear weapon free
countries: Austria, Faeroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, Japan, Malta, Federated States
of Micronesia, New Zealand, The Northern Marianas, Republic of Palau, Papua New
Guinea, The Seychelles, The Solomons, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Vanlatu. Additionally, there are five nuclear weapon free zone treaties: South Pacific Treaty (1985) (8
countries); International Seabed Treaty (1971) (73 countries); Latin America Treaty
(1967) (24 countries); Outer Space Treaty (1967) (83 countries); and Antarctic Treaty
(1959) (26 countries). See 3 THE NEW ABOLITIONIST (1985).
3. See infra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 31-70 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 81-122 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
11. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202, preamble cl. 1 (1986).
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cerns, the remaining clauses set out more specifically the various
reasons for the Ordinance and reflect, to some degree, the emphasis
on the economic underpinnings of the Ordinance. Clauses two,
three and four address the negative effects on the local economy of
nuclear weapon activities in the City and conclude that such activities result in inherent economic instability, drain municipal resources, and divert the community's physical and human resources
to nonbeneficial uses.' 2
Clause five contains a finding that the security requirements that
accompany nuclear weapon-related activities conflict with the general welfare. These requirements, according to the Ordinance, impoverish the City's civic life by insulating important local activities
from local scrutiny and accountability. The requirements also foster an atmosphere of fear and oppression which inhibits a vital
13
civic life.

Clauses six and seven identify the health threats to Chicago residents posed by local nuclear weapon-related activities.' 4 The drafters of the Ordinance noted that deep-seated fears of nuclear war
are exacerbated by the immediate presence of nuclear weapon-related activities, thus impairing the psychological health of City residents. Moreover, these clauses express the view that such
activities increase the probability that the City and its residents
could be the target of terrorism or nuclear attack.' 5
Clause eight expresses the moral repugnance felt by Chicago residents at the prospect of nuclear weapon-related activities within
the boundaries of their community.16 Clause nine underscores the
desire of the Chicago citizenry for constructive steps to protect the
City from the harmful effects of nuclear weapon development."
Clause ten notes that the divisiveness engendered by nuclear
weapon-related activities has caused or will cause community discord which will sap City resources. 18 Clause eleven "reaffirms the
City's commitment to peace and prosperity."' 9
B.

ProhibitoryProvisions

The Ordinance provides that "[n]o person shall knowingly,
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

preamble cls. 2-4.
preamble cl. 5.
preamble cls. 6-7.
preamble
preamble
preamble
preamble

cl.
cl.
cl.
cl.

8.
9.
10.
11.
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within the City of Chicago, design, produce, deploy, launch, maintain, or store nuclear weapons or components of nuclear weapons." 20 This prohibition becomes effective two years after the date
punishable by up to thirty days imof adoption. 21 Violations are 22
prisonment and a $1,000 fine.
The Ordinance does not single out for regulation the radioactive
materials used in nuclear weapons. Rather, it prohibits activities
directly connected with "any device, radioactiveor non-radioactive,
in and contribute to the operaspecifically designed to be installed
23
tion of a nuclear weapon.
Despite its title, the Ordinance does not absolutely ban all activities in Chicago that relate to nuclear weapons. The Ordinance specifically excludes the following activities from its reach: (1) basic
research;24 (2) any writing or speech devoted to public commentary
or debate, or other speech protected by the first amendment;25
(3) the research and application of nuclear medicine; 26 (4) the use
of radioactive material in consumer products; 27 and (5) nuclear
2
weapons work by the federal government or an agency thereof. 1
The Ordinance narrowly focuses on nuclear weapons. It defines
nuclear weapons as including only "the means of transporting,
guiding, propelling, triggering, or detonating the weapon, provided
that such means is destroyed or rendered useless in the normal
transporting, guiding, propelling, triggering, or detonation of the
weapon."29 A nuclear weapon component is defined narrowly as a
device "specifically designed to be installed in and contribute to the
operation of a nuclear weapon." 30 Thus, the Ordinance would not
reach the manufacture or operation of non-nuclear equipment such
as radar, computers or planes which are integral parts of nuclear
weapon systems.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

§ 202.2(a).
§ 202.7.
§ 202.1(c) (emphasis added).
§ 202.2(c)(ii).
§ 202.2(c)(iii).
§ 202.2(c)(iv).
§ 202.2(c)(v).
§ 202.2(c)(vi).
§ 202. 1(b) (emphasis added).
§ 202.1(c) (emphasis added).
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III.

STATE PREEMPTION AND THE EXERCISE

OF HOME RULE POWER

A.

The Nature of Home Rule Power

The American political system vests state legislatures with complete legislative power limited only by state and federal constitutions.1 State legislatures, in turn, traditionally retain absolute
discretion both in defining the form of and in delegating legislative
power to municipal corporations. 32 The dependent status of municipal corporations results from the application of Dillon's Rule,33
which provides:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporationpossesses and can exercise the followingpowers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial
doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation, and the power is denied.34
The definition of the limited powers traditionally granted municipalities became increasingly problematic as urbanization proceeded and the need for substantial and innovative municipal
government initiatives became evident.35 In response, a majority of
states enacted "home rule" provisions which delegated to municipal corporations many of the powers reserved to state legislatures
under the federal system. Home rule provisions have in effect
vested municipal corporations with the general power to govern for
the benefit of their citizens.36
B.

Home Rule in Illinois

Until the adoption of the Illinois constitution of 1970, Illinois
adhered to the traditional allocation of extremely limited power to
31. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1964).
32. Id. at 646-47.
33. 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 488 (5th ed. 1911). See generally Frug,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
34. 1 DILLON, supra note 33, at 488.
35. See generally Sandalow, supra note 31, at 652-58; 7 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1605-16 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. The seventh volume of the Proceedings contains the report of the Committee
on Local Government which drafted the Illinois home rule provision.

36.

Sandalow, supra note 31, at 656-58.
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municipal corporations.3" This distribution of power between the
state and local governments was profoundly altered by the home
rule provision in the 1970 constitution.3"
The home rule provision in the Illinois constitution confers one
of the most liberal grants of home rule powers in the country.39
The provision sets out the grant of home rule power by providing
that "a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any
function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public
health, safety, morals and welfare."' In addition, home rule units
have the power to license, tax, and incur debt.4 This grant of
power was designed to insure that municipal corporations receive
the broadest possible range of powers to deal with the problems
facing them.
The framers of the Illinois constitution took several steps to protect the broad grant of home rule power from judicial constriction.
First, they specified the four key components of home rule
power-the powers to regulate, license, tax and incur indebtedness.42 Second, they retained the "including, but not limited to"
language in the home rule provision to make clear that the enumerated powers are not exclusive.4 3 Third, they included a provision
directing courts to construe liberally the powers and functions of
home rule units.'
Because home rule is a reallocation of power betveen the Illinois
General Assembly and home rule units, the state constitution sets
out the terms of their relationship. By a three-fifths majority the
General Assembly "may deny or limit the power to tax and any
other power or function of the home rule unit not exercised or performed by the State ....,41 By a simple majority "[tihe General
Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise
37. See Ives v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 582, 198 N.E.2d 518 (1964).
38. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6. See generally Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois
Home Rule (PartI): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137. The late Professor
Baum was counsel to the Committee on Local Government. See also Kanellos v. County
of Cook, 53 I11.
2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1972).
39. For a detailed history of the drafting of the home rule provision at the Sixth
Constitutional Convention, see Anderson & Lousin, From Bone Gap to Chicago: A History of The Local Government Article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC.
& PROC. 698 (1976).
40. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
41. Id.
42. See Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill.
2d 537, 539, 338 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1975).
43. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m).
44. Id.
45. Id. at § 6(g).
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by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit.... 46
When the General Assembly has not spoken on an issue, the Illinois constitution provides for the concurrent exercise of power by
home rule units.4 7
C.

The Ordinance and Home Rule Power

There is no checklist of home rule powers against which the validity of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Ordinance can be determined. The grant of home rule power is broad; it contemplates,
and perhaps encourages, a high degree of innovation and initiative
by municipalities.4" However, Illinois courts have employed a
common methodology when faced with challenges to municipal exercises of home rule power. As a threshold matter the Ordinance,
like all legislation, must be rationally related to its stated goals.4 9
The Ordinance easily satisfies this initial requirement.5 0
First, there is substantial evidence that nuclear weapon activities
can sap a municipality's long term economic strength by diverting
municipal and private resources from the production of consumer
goods and services and by making the local economy dependent
upon the vagaries of government funding.5
Because nuclear
weapon-related activities appear to be minimal in Chicago at present, the Ordinance is prophylactic and its application will not have
significant adverse economic consequences. 5 2 The Ordinance is
46. Id. at § 6(h).
47. Id. at § 6(i).
48. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 502, 470 N.E.2d 266, 274
(1984).
49. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). See generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional
Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
50. See Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 389 N.E.2d 529
(1979); see also Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 268 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1982).
51. See generally BOSTON STUDY GROUP, THE PRICE OF DEFENSE: A NEW STRATEGY FOR MILITARY SPENDING (1979); Galbraith, Economics of the Arms Race-and
After, in THE FINAL EPIDEMIC: PHYSICIANS AND SCIENTISTS ON NUCLEAR WAR 48-57
(R. Adams & S. Cullon eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as FINAL EPIDEMIC]; Sidel, Buying
Death with Taxes: Impact of Arms Race on Health Care, in FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra, at
35-47. See also CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION WORK IN CHICAGO 3 (Feb. 14, 1986).
One goal of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") is the abolition of all offensive nuclear weapons. Such a development would have obvious negative
economic effects on local economies dependent upon nuclear weapon industries.
52. See CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PRODUCTION WORK IN CHICAGO 2 (Feb. 14, 1986). The study estimates that
unclassified federal contracts awarded to Chicago companies for nuclear weapons work
totalled $1.5 million in the 1984-85 period and generated 30 jobs. The department was

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 17

therefore rationally related to its stated economic goals.
The Ordinance also was designed to protect the health and
safety of Chicago's citizens. The constant threat of nuclear war
may have harmful psychological effects in the form of anxiety and
moral and psychic numbness. 3 Further, the detonation of even a
single nuclear weapon over Chicago would extinguish the community in a matter of seconds." Thus, it was not unreasonable for the
City Council to conclude that ridding Chicago of nuclear weapon
facilities would stimulate an improvement in the psychological
health of its citizens and limit the risk that the City will be targeted
for nuclear destruction or nuclear weapon-related terrorism. 55
The position that nuclear weapon production by private parties
is contrary to fundamental moral values derives support from Chicago residents. In 1982, Chicago voters passed by a clear majority
a resolution calling for a freeze on nuclear weapon production. 6
Moreover, Chicago's Roman Catholic Archbishop headed a committee of Catholic clergymen which drafted a pastoral letter outlining the strong moral objections to the production and use of
nuclear weapons. 57 This again suggests a rational connection between the Ordinance and the City Council's goals.
Since the Ordinance meets the rationality requirement, it next
must be examined under the three-pronged analysis employed by
unable to determine the amount of classified procurements of nuclear weapon components from Chicago companies. Id.
The Ordinance attempts to mitigate the negative economic impact of its implementation in two ways. First, it provides a two-year grace period for persons currently engaging in nuclear weapon-related activities. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202,
§ 202.2(a) (1986). Second, it authorizes the creation of a Peace Conversion Commission
which will "prepare a detailed plan for the conversion of resources and physical plants to
peaceful and productive uses and ...develop alternative sources of employment for persons currently employed in the nuclear weapons industry." Id. at § 202.3.
53. See generally Lifton, In a Dark Time..., in FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 51, at 720; Mack, Psychosocial Trauma, in FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 51, at 21-34.
54. See U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE EFFECTS
OF NUCLEAR WAR (U.S.G.P.O. 1979); Lewis, The Prompt and Delayed Effects of Nuclear War, 241 SCI. AM. 35 (1979); see also COMMITrEE FOR THE COMPILATION OF
MATERIALS, HIROSHIMA & NAGASAKI (1981); FINAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 51, at 93218 (extensive coverage of medical consequences of nuclear war by several authors).
55. The military importance of a major city will affect its chances of actually becoming a target in the event of a limited nuclear war. The Ordinance is designed in part to
lessen the military importance of Chicago by limiting nuclear weapon-related activities in
the city. For a discussion of the concept of limited nuclear war see H. KISSINGER, NuCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1957); McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons
and the Atlantic Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 753 (1982).
56. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202, preamble cls. 9, 11 (1986).
57. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF
PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1983).
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Illinois courts in the home rule area. First, and most importantly,
the court must determine if the City's exercise of power "pertain[s]
to its government and affairs.""8 The courts look to three factors
in determining whether a municipality's exercise of power satisfies
this requirement. First, if the challenged action has a substantial
impact outside municipal boundaries, the requirement is not satisfied.5 9 The Ordinance satisfies this judicial requirement by having
no significant impact outside Chicago's boundaries. The Ordinance regulates private institutions located in Chicago and addresses local economic, health and moral problems caused by
private nuclear weapons industries. Activities of the federal government and its agencies, for example, are exempt because such
regulation would have extra-territorial effects. 60 Furthermore, the
Ordinance does not prevent other municipalities from permitting
or even encouraging nuclear weapon-related activities.
The Ordinance admittedly is directed at the local manifestations
of a problem of international dimension. However, every problem
properly addressed by a home rule city--economic development,
pollution, health, morals-may have a larger dimension which extends well beyond city boundaries. An ordinance that is applied
against local actors to mitigate the local manifestations of a larger
problem is thus a proper exercise of home rule power. 6'
Second, courts look to the Illinois constitution to determine if
the activity or institution sought to be locally regulated is of statewide character. 62 It is unlikely that the Ordinance affects the oper58. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). The Local Government Committee of the Illinois
Constitutional Convention outlined the rationale for the "pertaining to" clause as
follows:
It is clear, however, that the powers of home rule units relate to their own
problems, not to those of the state or the nation. Their power should not extend
to such matters as divorce, real property law, trusts, contracts, etc. which are
generally recognized as falling within the competence of state rather than local
authorities.
7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 1621. Thus, the proposed grant of power to local
government extends only to matters "pertaining to their government and affairs." ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
59. See Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 I11.
2d 256, 347 N.E.2d
716 (1976) (attempted regulation of sewage treatment plant serving six other
municipalities).
60. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). See generally Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
61. People ex rel. Lignoul v. City of Chicago, 67 I11.
2d 480, 368 N.E.2d 100 (1977).
62. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. City of Peoria, 76 I11.
2d 469, 394 N.E.2d 399 (1979)
(school system - art. X, § 1); People ex rel. Lignoul v. City of Chicago, 67 Ill. 2d 480, 368
N.E.2d 100 (1977) (branch banking - art. XIII, § 8); Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 111. 2d
537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975) (court system - art. VI).
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ation of any institution of statewide character because the Illinois
constitution does not create a state board of nuclear weapons development (or disarmament).63 The State of Illinois also has not
traditionally regulated nuclear weapons development, 64 and nuclear weapons-related activity has yet to be treated by the state as
having a quasi-utility nature. 65 Rather, such activities are conducted by a large number of private companies and federal agencies.66 The Ordinance thus can be targeted precisely against private
nuclear weapon-related activities within Chicago's boundaries
without affecting any unitary activity of a regional or statewide
scope.
Finally, courts examining the "pertaining to government affairs"
requirement determine whether state regulation of an area is so
embedded in our legal traditions that additional regulation by
home rule units is inappropriate.67 Thus, Illinois courts have
struck down local initiatives which infringed upon the state's regulation of electric utilities6" and its method of collecting property
taxes. 69 This third category is quite narrow, for it is axiomatic that
neither a state's interest in nor its regulation of an area forecloses
concurrent regulation by home rule units. 70 The Ordinance does
not violate this requirement.
The issue under the second prong of the analysis is whether the
General Assembly specifically has barred local exercise of a power
63. See Board of Educ. v. City of Peoria, 76 Ill. 2d 469, 394 N.E.2d 399 (1979);
People ex rel. Lignoul v. City of Chicago, 67 Ill. 2d 480, 368 N.E.2d 100 (1977). The
Ordinance does not interfere with laws that require statewide uniformity. It also leaves
untouched the laws of contracts, torts, and real property. There is no state law of general
application that is directed either in favor of or against nuclear weapons development.
64. The State of Illinois has, however, regulated other aspects of nuclear activity. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
27-25 to 27-27 (1985) (Nuclear Energy Education Act); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, T 1025(b) (1985) (nuclear fuel reprocessing plant construction
regulations and environmental feasibility report); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 3 (creating
Department of Nuclear Safety).
65. Gage v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 356 F. Supp. 80 (N.D. I11. 1972) (statechartered electric power utility company can be required to produce environmental impact study without regard to Atomic Energy Commission regulations).
66. See A. MILLER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW (1984).
67. See Bridgman v. Korzen, 54 Ill. 2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9 (1972); Peoples Gas, Light
& Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill. App. 3d 95, 465 N.E.2d 603 (1st Dist. 1984).
68. See Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill. App. 3d 95, 465
N.E.2d 603 (1st Dist. 1984).
69. See Bridgman v. Korzen, 54 Ill. 2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9 (1972).
70. See, e.g., Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 266
(1984) (upholding local gun control ordinance); City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill.
2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981) (upholding local landlord-tenant ordinance); County of
Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979) (upholding
local environmental regulation); see also ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
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or has declared its own exercise to be exclusive."' In order for such
preemption to have occurred, the General Assembly must have
strictly complied with the state constitutional requirement by specifically declaring its intention to bar the exercise of a home rule
power or to make its own exercise of that power exclusive.72
The General Assembly has not prohibited municipalities from
using home rule power to phase out private nuclear weapon development activities within their boundaries. 7 Because it has not directed any special attention to these activities, the General
Assembly has had no occasion to declare its own exercise of jurisdiction to be exclusive.7 4 Absent an express statement of preemption the Ordinance remains a valid exercise of home rule power.75
As the third and final step in the analysis, the courts determine
whether the home rule legislation is consistent with state law. 6
Existing state laws and regulations place no relevant limits on the
Ordinance. It is clear that, absent express preemption, home rule
units have expansive power to legislate concurrently with the state
as long as their regulations are consistent with those of the state.77
Illinois' environmental protection, s nuclear safety preparedness, 9
and deadly weapons 80 statutes are only tangentially related to the
Ordinance.
IV.

THE ORDINANCE AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the Constitution and laws of the United States are the
supreme law of the land and binding on the states. 81 The clause
requires that federal law preempt local regulation of any area over
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g).
72. See Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 832 (1976).
73. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g).
74. Id. at § 6(h).
75. See Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 832 (1976).
76. See County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d
553 (1979).
77. See id. at 508, 389 N.E.2d at 556.
1
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2, 1002 (1985).
79. Id. at 4301.
24-1 (1985).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
71.

81.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
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which Congress has expressly or impliedly exercised exclusive authority.82 The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that the
inquiry into whether a particular local law enacted pursuant to a
state's police powers violates the Supremacy Clause begins with the
assumption that state police powers are not superseded by federal
83
law unless such preemption is clearly intended by Congress.
Federal preemption of local law can occur in either of two general ways:
[F]irst, if Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field,
any state law falling within that field is preempted.... [S]econd,
if Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the
matter in question, state law is still preempted to the extent it
actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible
to comply with both state and federal law,... or where the state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 4
In examining the Ordinance under the first prong of the
Supreme Court's preemption analysis, the inquiry should focus
upon whether Congress has demonstrated an intent to preempt all
local control over matters relating to the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. In order to assess congressional intent,
it is necessary to review federal legislation relating to atomic energy and nuclear weapons.
A.

The Atomic Energy Act

Following the first controlled nuclear reaction in 1942, the test
of the atomic bomb in 1945, and its military use during the final
stages of World War II, it became apparent that legislation was
needed to control such a powerful and potentially dangerous
source of energy. Congress responded by enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.85 The act established the Atomic Energy Commission (the "AEC") and empowered the AEC to regulate all
fissionable materials. 8 6 Thus, during the early stages of the development of nuclear technology, regulation and control over all uses
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
82. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
83. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
84. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
85. 60 Stat. 755, former 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
86. 60 Stat. 755, former 42 U.S.C. § 1804 (1946) (repealed 1974).
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of atomic energy87 resided exclusively in the hands of the federal
government.8 8
Eight years later Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (the "Act") 89 in order to bring the original 1946 act into accord with new developments in the field of atomic energy. 90 The
Act regulates both peaceful and military applications of atomic energy. In enacting the legislation, Congress declared it
to be the policy of the United States that ... the development,
use and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make
the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all
times to the paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense and security. 91
The Act implements this policy by establishing a federal program
for regulation and licensing of nuclear materials used for commercial and industrial purposes as well as those used for the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. It vests the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (the "NRC") 92 with exclusive jurisdiction
to license the transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession and
use of special nuclear material. 93 The Act also grants to the NRC
the authority to research and develop military applications of
atomic energy and to engage in the production of nuclear
weapons.

94

While the Act authorizes the development and manufacture of
nuclear weapons and regulates the handling of special nuclear
materials, it does not expressly require states or localities to authorize the manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon
components by private licensees within their borders. Nor does the
Act prohibit states or localities from deciding, as an absolute or
conditional matter, whether to permit nuclear weapon-related ac87. The term "atomic energy" means "all forms of energy released in the course of
nuclear fission or nuclear transformation." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (Supp. I 1984).
88. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983).
89. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. H 1984)).
90. For a detailed history of the Act, see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206-11 (1983).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 201 1(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
92. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission replaced the Atomic Energy Commission.
See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5879 (1982).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(e), 2014(z)(2), 2014(aa), 2061-2064, 2071, 2073-2078, 20912099, 2111-2131 (1982); see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 207 (1983). The term "special nuclear material"
means plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and other
materials as defined in the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1982).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2051(a)(3), 2121 (1982).
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tivities by private licensees within their borders. 95
Absent such express language, however, the question still remains whether the Act was intended to preserve the federal government as the sole regulator of all nuclear matters. Moreover, if
the field is implicitly preempted, it still must be determined
whether the Ordinance falls within the scope of preemption. The
resolution of these issues depends on the division of federal and
state regulatory authority that is imposed by the Act.
B.

Federal and State Regulation of Atomic Energy

In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court has addressed state
regulations which had direct impacts upon aspects of atomic energy regulated by the Act. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission,96
and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., the Supreme Court was asked
to strike down state regulations because they allegedly interfered
with federal regulation of atomic energy.
In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court considered a California statute which prohibited the construction of any nuclear power generating plants until a method for disposal of radioactive wastes was
approved by the NRC. 98 The statute's drafters feared that nuclear
generation of electricity would be economically unviable unless a
disposal method was developed. 99 Although the statute gave California an effective veto over new construction of any nuclear generating stations within the state, the Court held that the statute was
not preempted by the Act."°
In Silkwood, the Supreme Court upheld an award of punitive
damages under state common law for nuclear radiation injuries
caused by a plant which fabricated plutonium fuel pins for use as
reactor fuel in nuclear power plants. The Court allowed the award
to stand even though the Act expressly vests the NRC with exclusive regulatory authority over the radiation safety aspects of
atomic energy development.101
95. The Ordinance expressly exempts "direct activities of the Federal government"
from its prohibitions. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202, § 202.2(c)(vi) (1986).
Therefore, this analysis focuses only on whether the prohibition against development of
nuclear weapons by private licensees is preempted by the Act.
96. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
97. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
98. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 197-98.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 216.
101. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 258.
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In Pacific Gas and Silkwood, the Supreme Court upheld the state
activities because they regulated areas that were not preempted by
the Act. As the Supreme Court noted in Pacific Gas, and elaborated upon in Silkwood, Congress had created in the Act a scheme
which permits the dual regulation of atomic energy. Thus, the federal government maintains complete control over the radiation
safety aspects of atomic energy, while the states may continue to
exercise their traditional legislative authority over economic and
other police power concerns, such as the need for additional elecof facilities to be licensed,
tric power generating facilities, the type
02
land use, rate making, and the like.'
Based on this division of authority between the federal and state
governments, the Supreme Court in Pacific Gas upheld the California statute because it found an adequate non-radiation-safety rationale for the moratorium on nuclear power plant construction.
The Court noted that the statute was aimed at economic concerns
which were outside the federally occupied field of nuclear safety
regulation. 0 3 Similarly, in Silkwood, the Court upheld the lower
court's decision that the punitive damage award was not preempted because the state law that authorized it was concerned with
something other than radiation safety. °4
Pacific Gas and Silkwood make it clear that although Congress
intended to occupy the entire field of nuclear safety concerns-and
thus preempt state regulation aimed at the radiation safety aspects
of atomic energy-state regulation that has a legitimate economic
or other police power rationale is not preempted. It is, therefore,
necessary to determine whether the Ordinance falls within the area
of permissible state regulation;0 5 that is, whether the Ordinance is
aimed at police power concerns or at radiation hazards.
102. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212; Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248-50; see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(k) (Supp. 1 1984). Section 2021 addresses the role of the states in regulating
atomic energy, and part (k) of this section provides as follows: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency to regulate activities
for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." Id.
The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision "as a reflection of the general distinction between federal and state authority to regulate activities covered by the Atomic
Energy Act." Brown v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 767 F.2d 1234, 1241 n.4 (7th Cir.
1985) (citing Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 210).
103. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216. "Without a permanent means of disposal, the nuclear waste problem could become critical, leading to unpredictably high costs to contain
the problem or, worse, shutdowns in reactors." Id. at 213-14.
104. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 258.
105. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213; Brown v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 767 F.2d
1234, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1985) ("the preemption issue normally turns on whether the state
is regulating radiation or non-radiation hazards.").
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The Ordinance and the State's Legitimate Economic and
Other Police Power Concerns

The preamble to the Ordinance sets forth several purposes for its
enactment, all of which are based on the state's traditional power
to regulate the community's public health, safety, morals, economic well-being, and general welfare. 0 6 The Ordinance bans the
manufacture of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon components
by private parties in the City of Chicago because such activities
may cause economic instability, deplete the City's resources, create
a need for excessive security, and threaten the public health.107
The Supreme Court has emphasized that a court presented with
the question of whether a law is preempted should accept the legislators' avowed purpose for enacting the law and should not become
embroiled in attempting to ascertain the legislators' true motives. 0 Thus, in Pacific Gas, the Court explained that inquiry into
legislative motive is often an unsatisfactory venture because one
legislator may have motives for enacting a statute which are quite
different from those of another legislator. 0 9
According to the purposes set forth in the preamble to Chicago's
Ordinance, the City is not encroaching upon the area of nuclear
regulation that has been preempted by the federal government.
The Ordinance does not ban the manufacture of nuclear weapons
in Chicago because of the risks associated with the radioactive
materials used by the nuclear weapons industry. In fact, the Ordinance makes no mention of safety risks associated with the nuclear
technology on which the nuclear weapons industry relies. The Ordinance is instead aimed at economic, moral, and public health
concerns. Thus, under Pacific Gas and Silkwood, the Ordinance
operates in a regulatory area which has not been preempted by the
Act and which, therefore, has been expressly reserved to the
states. I10
106. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442
(1960); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 578 (7th Cir. 1982).
107. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202, preamble cis. 1-8 (1986).
108. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216.
109. Id.
110. An ordinance banning the manufacture of nuclear weapons must be distinguished from state and local laws banning the transportation of nuclear wastes within the
state or locality's borders. The latter legislation is expressly preempted because it is predicated on radiation safety concerns and thus ignores the division between federal and
state authority created by the Act. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of
Lavevy, 772 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Washington State Bldg. & Construction
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 419
(1983). In addition, such legislation has been expressly preempted by the Hazardous
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D.

The Ordinanceand the Objectives of Congress

The second part of the preemption analysis focuses upon
whether the Ordinance is impermissible because it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."' Specifically, the question is whether
the Ordinance, although not attempting to regulate radiation
hazards, is nonetheless preempted because it frustrates achieve112
ment of one or more of the purposes of the Act.
The Act unquestionably gives the federal government authority
to engage in the research, development and manufacture of nuclear
weapons. "' The Ordinance expressly exempts these federal government activities.1 " 4 Nothing in the Act, however, indicates that a
local community must harbor private nuclear weapon-related activities when that community has concluded, on non-radiation-safety
grounds, that such activities are economically burdensome, unhealthful and morally repugnant to its members.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Pacific Gas established that
there is substantial room for non-radiation-safety regulation of nuclear industries by state and local governments based on police
power concerns. In upholding the state moratorium, even though
it effectively halted the development of nuclear power in California, the Supreme Court explained that:
the promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished "at all
costs." The elaborate licensing and safety provisions and the
continued preservation of state regulation in traditional areas belie [such a view]. The legal reality remains that Congress has left
sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nu-5
clear power to be slowed or even stoppedfor economic reasons. 1
The Supreme Court relied on similar analysis in Silkwood to reMaterials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1982), which provides for exclusive
federal regulation of the safety aspects of the transportation of nuclear waste. See Jersey
Central Power, 772 F.2d at 1112-13. The Ordinance does not ban the transportation of
nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components through the City.
111. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 220.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1982) provides: "a program for government control of the
possession, use, and production of atomic energy and special nuclear material, whether
owned by the government or others, so directed as to make the maximum contribution to
the common defense and security and the national welfare."
113. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2051(a)(2), 2121(a) (1982).
114. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202, § 202.2(c)(vi) (1986).
115. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 222-23 (emphasis added). In Brown v. Kerr-McGee
Chem. Corp., 767 F.2d 1234, 1241 (7th Cir. 1985), decided after Pacific Gas, the court
noted that state laws regulating pollution standards, building codes, and public nuisances
are "undoubtedly valid" as applied to a factory which processes radioactive materials as
long as the laws are not enforced to regulate radiation hazards.

570
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ject the claim that allowing the punitive damage award would frustrate Congress' express desire to encourage widespread
participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes.I 6 The Court explained that it is not "inconsistent to vest the NRC with exclusive regulatory authority over
the safety aspects of nuclear development while at the same time
allowing plaintiffs
. . . to recover for injuries caused by nuclear
7
hazards."'"
The complementary regulatory roles of the federal and state governments, as stated in the act and interpreted in Pacific Gas and
Silkwood, should extend to regulation by the Ordinance of the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons by private parties.
There is no language in the Act which indicates that Congress did
not intend for the states to retain non-radiation-safety regulatory
authority over all aspects of nuclear energy application, including
the manufacture of nuclear weapons. 1s
The only appellate court to have considered whether the Act
preempts all local regulation affecting the nuclear weapons industry has, not surprisingly, followed the rationale of Pacific Gas and
Silkwood. In McKay v. United States, 19 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered whether owners of property adjacent to a nuclear weapons manufacturing facility could recover damages from
the weapons manufacturer under state tort law. Owners of land
surrounding a weapons plant in Colorado sued the United States,
Dow Chemical Company and Rockwell International Corporation
for damage which occurred when soil became contaminated with
nuclear material used to manufacture nuclear weapons. The weapons plant was regulated under the Act, and although the plant was
operated by private companies under management contracts, all
work was performed for the federal government. The plant manufactured nuclear weapons using large quantities of by-product
or
20
special nuclear materials specifically regulated by the Act.1
The federal government and the weapons manufacturers argued
that the landowners had no state-law remedy because any state interference with the manufacture of nuclear weapons was preempted by the Act.' 2' The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument
and refused to distinguish the nuclear weapons industry from other
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982).
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 258.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982).
703 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 465 n.1.
Id. at 466.
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industries that use nuclear materials. The Tenth Circuit noted that
"[d]espite the importance of national defense, the Act does not
shield nuclear weapons manufacturers from liability for their negligence."' 22 McKay thus supports the contention that the private
nuclear weapon manufacturers covered by the Ordinance are not
provided any special status under the Act. The areas of permissible state regulation remain regardless of whether the nuclear activity at issue involves the peaceful or military application of nuclear
energy.
V. THE ORDINANCE AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce. 23 The tenth amendment reserves to the states all powers that the Constitution has not
delegated to the federal government or specifically prohibited the
states from exercising.1 24 The Illinois constitution, in turn, grants
local units within the state the authority to enact legislation pertaining to their government and affairs, including the authority to
exercise police power for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare.' 2 The scope of local regulation is subject to
limitation by the Commerce Clause.
In order to stay within the limitations of the Commerce Clause,
a local ordinance must not (1) unduly discriminate against interstate commerce, (2) unduly burden the physical flow of commerce
from one state to another, or (3) regulate an activity which has
been preempted by the federal government's exercise of its Commerce Clause power.126 The Supreme Court has consistently inval122. Id. at 469. A federal government determination that a certain activity is necessary to the national defense does not preclude individual tort recoveries for damages
arising from that activity. See, e.g., Madison v. United States, 679 F.2d 736 (8th Cir.
1982) (explosion of photoflash cartridges); Aretz v. United States, 604 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1979) (trip flare fire); Toole v. United States, 588 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1978) (explosion of
antitank explosive); United States v. Babbs, 483 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1973) (combustible
cartridge fire); Pigott v. United States, 451 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1971) (damage caused by
NASA rocket test); H.L. Properties, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1006
(S.D. Fla. 1971) (hydrochloric acid created by rocket emissions resulting in damage to
crops), af'd, 468 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Kuhne v. United States, 267 F.
Supp. 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (exposure to radiation while manufacturing nuclear bomb
material).
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(a) provides that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with Indian Tribes."
124. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
125. ILL. CONST. art VII, § 6(a).
126. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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idated, as violative of the Commerce Clause, state and local
legislation that has attempted to afford local residents an economic
advantage at the expense of the free flow of commerce among the
states.127 The decisive question under the "discrimination test" is
whether the statute, in purpose or effect, favors residents to the
disadvantage of nonresidents in the competitive national market. 128
The Ordinance does not discriminate against interstate commerce because it does not distinguish in any way between interstate
and intrastate activities. By banning all private nuclear weaponrelated activities in the City of Chicago regardless of where the
materials for manufacture originated, the Ordinance affects Chicago residents and nonresidents equally. As a regulation of general
application designed to improve the health and welfare of the community, the Ordinance is consonant with the first branch of Commerce Clause limitations.
The second Commerce Clause inquiry is whether the Ordinance
unduly burdens the free flow of commerce. Since the early case of
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia,29 the
Supreme Court has distinguished between those subjects which require a uniform national rule and those which allow diverse treatment in order to address local concerns. Some subjects by their
1 30
very natures require uniform regulation throughout the country.
When the subject being locally regulated involves legitimate local concerns, as the Ordinance does, the Court typically employs a
balancing test to determine whether the burden on interstate commerce is reasonable. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 131 the Court
provided a summary of the essential analysis:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
127. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
128. For example, the Court struck down an Arizona law requiring Arizona-grown
melons to be packaged within that state, a requirement which gave an advantage to local
enterprise. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Similarly, when New York
refused to permit a plant to distribute milk for shipment to Boston, the Court found that
the regulation protected local economic interests and impermissibly discriminated against
interstate commerce. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
129. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
130. The well-known "mudflaps" cases typify the subjects which require uniform federal regulation. When the effect of differing state regulation of subjects such as the design
of mudflaps makes the movement of goods across state lines unreasonably difficult because, for example, a different style of mudflaps on trucks would be required as a truck
crossed from one state into another, the regulation impermissibly burdens the flow of
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
131. 347 U.S. 137 (1970).
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such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate localpurpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.13 2
In assessing the validity of the Ordinance, the first step is thus to
determine whether it burdens the free flow of commerce across
state lines. If the Ordinance does have this effect, the second step
is to determine whether the burden is reasonable.
Because Chicago's Ordinance does not restrict the transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon components through
the City, it imposes little or no burden on the free flow of interstate
commerce. Moreover, even if the Ordinance were to impose some
slight burden on the flow of interstate commerce, that burden
would be minute in relation to the local benefits. As the Ordinance
is applied to achieve its police power goals, it will affect the local
economy. The Ordinance may force some companies to gradually
phase out some activities, and will probably make Chicago more
attractive to some people and businesses and less attractive to
others. These effects are not unreasonably burdensome to commerce. Many other local exercises of police power-such as those
which limit or prohibit the sale of alcohol,13 3 the sale or possession
of handguns,"' the operation of landfills, 135 the dissemination of
pornography,1 36 or hours of business operation137 -have been upheld as consonant with the Commerce Clause. The Ordinance arguably creates no greater burden on commerce than do these other,
admittedly valid, regulations.
With respect to the preemption prong of the Commerce Clause
analysis, courts are reluctant to infer preemption of the local police
power unless Congress has clearly indicated its intention to pre132. Id. at 142 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
133. See, e.g., Philly's v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding Illinois' local
option liquor law which allows voters to vote their precincts dry).
134. See, e.g., Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d
266 (1984) (upholding local gun control ordinance); see also Quilici v. Village of Morton
Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 268 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 104 (1983).
135. See, e.g., County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389
N.E.2d 553 (1979) (upholding application of local zoning laws against landfill operator).
136. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986) (upholding
strict zoning restrictions on location of adult movie theatres).
137. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws).
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empt. 138 Congress has never asserted its power under the Commerce Clause to preempt state or local authority to establish
nuclear weapon free zones. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently
upheld two state laws in the face of arguments that the Act had
preempted the entire field of nuclear regulation.139 In both cases,
the Court recognized the legitimacy of the state's purposes. Because the preamble to the Ordinance cites a host of legitimate local
concerns such as preserving the public health, morals and general
welfare from problems associated with the presence of nuclear
weapon-related activities in the City, the Ordinance satisfies the
preemption branch of the Commerce Clause test.
VI.

THE ORDINANCE AND FEDERAL WAR POWERS

The Constitution gives Congress extensive powers to declare and
wage war."4 These war powers are plenary and embrace every
phase of national defense. 4 ' Courts, however, will not presume
that Congress has exercised its war powers to preempt state and
local authority in the absence of clear and direct language to that
effect. 14 2 Unless Congress has established a policy to the contrary,
states may regulate private parties even though this regulation may
burden military activities of the federal government.143
In Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission,"4 the Supreme
Court upheld the application of state milk price regulations to sales
made to the military. The Court noted that the regulations imposed some burdens on the federal government,' 4 5 but emphasized
its reluctance to set aside local regulations in the absence of clear
138. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978); New York State
Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).
139. See Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
141. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); see also Woods v. Cloyd
W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (postwar rent controls a proper exercise of war
powers).
142. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1919); see also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978).
143. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (Court's determination that the state law was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act ended its inquiry); see also Note, Pre-emption as a
PreferentialGround. A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959) (discusses the Court's preference for employing a preemption analysis when Congress is active in an area, rather than determining directly the scope of the power granted Congress
by the Constitution without reference to legislation).
144. 318 U.S. 261 (1943); see also McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.
1983).
145. Penn Dairies, 318 U.S. at 271.
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congressional intent.1 46 It cautioned courts to "guard against
resolving these competing considerations of policy by imputing to
Congress
a decision which quite clearly it has not undertaken to
, 147

make."

Congress has exercised its war powers in the Atomic Energy
Act, 148 which deals comprehensively with all aspects of atomic energy, including military applications.149 As discussed supra in section IV, the Act does not preempt the Ordinance because it does
not prohibit local regulation of private parties engaged in nuclear
weapon-related activities. 50 Furthermore, since the Ordinance exempts the activities of the federal government,' 5 ' it will have at
most a limited impact upon federal military activities. The Ordinance thus does not conflict with the federal war powers.
VII.

THE ORDINANCE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
laws "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ,,
In
determining whether the Ordinance runs afoul of the amendment,
it should first be noted that the Ordinance specifically excludes
from its coverage both "basic research"' 53 and "any writing or
speech devoted to public commentary or debate or other speech
protected by the First Amendment. . "..",154 By clear language, the
Ordinance regulates only conduct that the City has determined to
be detrimental to the health, safety, morals and welfare of its people. It makes no attempt to infringe speech or those rights of free
speech that have traditionally been afforded first amendment
protection.
The Ordinance prohibits only conduct that entails the design,
production, deployment, launching, maintenance or storage of nuclear weapons or components. None of these activities inherently
constitute speech. Indeed, insofar as any of these activities may
involve basic research, writing, commentary, debate or other
speech protected by the first amendment, those speech elements of
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

154.

Id.
Id. at 275.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011, 2012 (1982).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2121, 2122 (1982).
See supra notes 81-122 and accompanying text.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 202, § 202.2(c)(ii) (1986).
Id. at § 202.2(c)(iii).
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the otherwise prohibited activities are expressly excluded from the
reach of the Ordinance.
The fact that conduct may contain elements of speech or may be
accomplished with the use of speech does not immunize that conduct from the reach of the City's power to regulate. In Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co. ,"5' the Supreme Court stated that "it has
never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech . . . to

make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in
part initiated, evidenced or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed." '56 This principle was recently
reiterated when the Supreme Court approved the disciplining of
attorneys for in-person solicitation of clients, an activity integrally
involving speech.' 57 The Court concluded that "the state does not
lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to
1 58
the public whenever speech is a component of that activity.9

Even if speech-related elements of nuclear weapon-related activities were subject to the Ordinance, there would be no conflict with
the first amendment. The City may, consistent with the first
amendment, regulate conduct which may in some instances involve
speech. Furthermore, the Ordinance is carefully drafted to avoid
any implication that protected speech-such as public debate-might be affected.
VIII.

THE ORDINANCE AND THE TAKING CLAUSE OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT

The fifth amendment to the Constitution prohibits the taking of
private property for public use "without just compensation.

15 9

However, when a municipality requires uncompensated obedience
to an ordinance reasonably enacted for the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare, the ordinance does not constitute a
"taking" without due compensation of law.160 Each member of the
community is presumed to benefit from an ordinance which promotes the general welfare. 161
155.
156.
157.
158.

336 U.S. 490 (1940).
Id. at 502.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Id. at 456.

159.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

160. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Illinois ex reL. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 562, 592-93 (1905).
161. Id. at 594; see also Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530,
542, 224 N.E.2d 793, 802 (1967) (even though an ordinance may interfere with rights to
contract, there is not denial of property without due process of law where the ordinance
is aimed at concerns within the police powers of the city); City of West Frankfort v.
Fullop, 6 Ill. 2d 609, 617, 129 N.E.2d 682, 687 (1955) (even if the exercise of the police
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Furthermore, the Ordinance on its face does not represent a taking. First, given the limited extent of nuclear weapon-related activities in the City, the Ordinance is prophylactic in nature. Second,
the City will not employ the Ordinance to appropriate private resources so that it can engage in nuclear weapon-related activity.
This Ordinance is similar to a myriad of perfectly legitimate municipal regulations which place limits on the use and enjoyment of
private property in order to improve the community. To regulate,
or even prohibit, activities found detrimental to the City's welfare
is not a "taking" without due process of law.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Ordinance is designed to phase
out over two years the design, production, deployment, launching,
maintenance or storage of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon
components within Chicago's boundaries. As set forth in its preamble, the Ordinance is designed to strengthen the local economy,
conserve municipal resources, protect the public health, and rid the
City of activities its citizens find morally repugnant. The Ordinance is drafted to avoid interfering with activities of the federal
government or with basic research, and it protects first amendment
freedoms.
We conclude that the Ordinance is legal. The Ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of the extensive home rule police powers vested
in Illinois municipalities by the Illinois constitution of 1970. It
regulates local parties to address local problems associated with
nuclear weapon-related activities within Chicago's boundaries.
The General Assembly has not preempted this type of regulation.
The Ordinance does not violate the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court has made clear,
the Atomic Energy Act does not preempt state regulation of the
non-radiation-safety aspects of atomic energy. Because the Ordinance does not address radiation safety concerns, it does not frustrate the purposes of the Act. The Ordinance also does not violate
the Commerce Clause. It is a valid exercise of police power which
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, unduly burden
the flow of interstate commerce, or interfere with federal regulatory activities. Similarly, the Ordinance does not conflict with the
federal war powers. The Atomic Energy Act is the most relevant
exercise of these war powers, and it does not preempt the Ordipower precludes the most profitable use of the property, it does not make that exercise
invalid as a "taking" without due process of law).
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nance. Furthermore, by exempting the federal government, the
Ordinance limits interference with federal activities.
The Ordinance does not infringe upon first amendment freedoms
because it regulates only conduct and exempts both basic research
and any writing or speech devoted to public commentary or debate. Finally, the Ordinance does not represent a taking of private
property without due process of law. To regulate, or even prohibit,
activities found detrimental to the City's welfare is not an unlawful
"taking."
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Appendix
COMMITTEE ON ECOMONIC DEVELOPMENT.
MUNICIPAL CODE AMENDED BY ADDING NEW CHAPTER 202
ENTITLED "THE NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE
CHICAGO ORDINANCE."

The Committee on Economic Development submitted the following report:
Chicago, March 12, 1986.
To the President and Members of the City Council:

Your Committee on Economic Development, having had under
consideration a proposed ordinance introduced by Aldermen Bernard Hansen (44th), David Orr (49th), et al., providing for the establishment of the City of Chicago as a Nuclear Weapon-Free
Zone, begs leave to recommend that Your Honorable Body Pass
said proposed ordinance which is transmitted herewith.
This recommendation was concurred in by eight (8) members of
the committee with no dissenting vote.
Respectfully submitted,
(Signed) Bernard J. Hansen,
Chairman.
On motion of Alderman Hansen, the said proposed ordinance
transmitted with the foregoing committee report was Passed by a
viva voce vote.
The following is said ordinance as passed:
WHEREAS, The people of Chicago find that the presence of

nuclear weapons facilities within Chicago is in direct conflict
with the maintenance of the community's public health, safety,
morals, economic well-being and general welfare; and
WHEREAS, The presence of the nuclear weapons industry in

Chicago threatens the development of a stable local economy because the demand for nuclear weapons may decline drastically in
the event of an arms control agreement or a freeze or reduction
in the United States Government's nuclear weapons arsenal; and
WHEREAS, The allocation of the City's resources in the form
of police, fire, and other municipal services to the nuclear weapons industry diverts the City's limited resources from urgently
needed human services such as job training, social services for
children, the elderly and disabled, shelter for the homeless, education, affordable housing, health care, public transportation,
emergency services and public safety; and
WHEREAS, The allocation of the community's private re-
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sources in the form of manufacturing, sales, services, education,
research and other forms of productive occupation to the nuclear
weapons industry diverts the community's limited resources from
fundamental human needs including food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, transportation, art, philosophy and recreation; and
WHEREAS, The security requirements accompanying the nuclear weapons industry unduly restrict the dissemination of information necessary for the citizens of Chicago to make informed
decisions regarding the future of their community, and foster a
climate of fear and mistrust; and
WHEREAS, The psychological health of the people of the
City of Chicago is threatened by the presence of an industry
which could make the City a target of terrorism or a nuclear
attack that would cause death and destruction unparalleled in
human history; and
WHEREAS, The presence of the nuclear weapons industry in
Chicago poses a public health threat to the community by increasing the likelihood that this community will be a target of
terrorism or a nuclear attack; and
WHEREAS, The public morality is affronted by the presence
of an industry profiting from activities which may ultimately lead
to unprecedented death and destruction in this community; and
WHEREAS, The people of the City of Chicago clearly expressed their will in 1982 when they passed the Nuclear Weapons
Freeze referendum by an overwhelming majority, demonstrating
their concern about the issue of nuclear weapons development;
and
WHEREAS, The issue of the presence of the nuclear weapons
industry in the City has caused severe dissention and discord and
has incited its citizens to voice their opposition and to assemble
in opposition to such controversial work, and these activities
have necessitated the reallocation of scarce police and fire department resources from other important tasks to the control and
protection of marchers, demonstrators, protestors and speakers,
have on occasion been disruptive of the public order, and have
required the City to divert its police forces in order to quell such
disruptions, all causing the City great expense; and
WHEREAS, By adopting this ordinance, the City Council, on
behalf of the citizens of Chicago, reaffirms the City's commitment to peace and prosperity and fulfills the responsibility it has
to the citizens of Chicago who supported the Nuclear Weapons
Freeze referendum; now, therefore,
Be It Ordained by the City Council of the City of Chicago:
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Section 1. That a new Chaper 202 of the Municipal Code be enacted,
entitled "The Nuclear Weapon Free Chicago Ordinance."
202.1 Definitions
For the purposes of this ordinance, the following definitions shall
apply:
a) "Person" means a natural person, as well as a corporation, institution, or other entity, but shall not include the federal government or any
agency thereof.
b) "Nuclear weapon" is any device, the purpose of which is use as a
weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device, the intended detonation of which results from the energy released by fission and/or fusion
reactions involving atomic nuclei. For the purpose of this ordinance,
''nuclear weapon" includes the weapon's guidance and propulsion system
and triggering mechanism, i.e., the means of transporting, guiding, propelling, triggering, or detonating the weapon, provided that such means
is destroyed or rendered useless in the normal transporting, guiding, propelling, triggering, or detonation of the weapon.
c) "Component of a nuclear weapon" is any device, radioactive or nonradioactive, specifically designed to be installed in and contribute to the
operation of a nuclear weapon.
d) "Direct activities of the federal government" shall mean actions of
the federal government or any agency thereof created by statute, but
shall exclude actions of independent contractors.
202.2 Prohibitions of Nuclear Weapons Work
a) Phase-Out of Present Activities: No person shall knowingly, within
the City of Chicago, design, produce, deploy, launch, maintain, or store
nuclear weapons or components of nuclear weapons. This prohibition
shall take effect two years after the adoption and publication of this
ordinance.
b) Prohibition of Commencement of Nuclear Weapons Work: No person who is not, as of the effective date of this ordinance, engaged in the
design, production, deployment, launching, maintenance or storage of
nuclear weapons or components of nuclear weapons, shall, within the
City of Chicago, commence any such activities after the effective date of
this ordinance.
c) Exclusion: Nothing in this Section shall be construed to prohibit:
i) any activity not specifically described in this section;
ii) basic research;
iii) any writing or speech devoted to public commentary or debate or other speech protected by the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution;
iv) the research and application of nuclear medicine;
v) uses of fissionable materials for smoke detectors, light-emitting watches and clocks, and other consumer products; or
vi) direct activities of the federal government.
202.3 Redirection of Resources Towards Human Needs
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The Mayor of the City of Chicago shall propose, and the City Council
shall establish, a Chicago Peace Conversion Commission which shall solicit testimony from the public and prepare a detailed plan for the conversion of resources and physical plants to peaceful and productive uses
and to develop alternative sources of employment for persons currently
employed in the nuclear weapons industry. The Peace Conversion Plan
shall be completed within two years of the adoption of this ordinance.
The Commission shall issue an interim report on its progress at the end
of the first year following the Commission's first meeting. This interim
report shall be presented to the City Council and copies shall be made
available to the news media for public disssemination.
The Peace Conversion Commission shall consist of seven members appointed by the Mayor of the City of Chicago, with the advice and consent of the City Council. Following the date of a communication from
the Mayor advising the Council of his nominations to the Commission,
the City Council shall have 60 days to either approve or reject the
Mayor's nominees. Should the City Council not act within that period of
time, the Mayor's nominees shall be considered to have received the
favorable approval of the City Council. The Mayor shall select one
member of the Commission to serve as Chairman of the Commission.
The Mayor shall provide staff support for the Commission from the
City's Department of Economic Development.
202.4 Civil Defense
Recognizing the futility of civil defense against nuclear war and its
ensuing radioactive contamination, the City declares that planning for or
participating in civil defense programs purporting to prepare for nuclear
attack is futile and dangerous. Therefore, the City will not participate in
any civil defense or population evacuation program exclusively intended
to be implemented upon the outbreak or threatened outbreak of nuclear
hostilities.
Nothing in this Section shall be construed to prohibit or limit any
other type of civil defense or emergency preparedness program.
202.5 Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Commemoration Day
In recognition of the first use of nuclear weapons against the Japanese
City of Hiroshima in 1945, August 6 shall be declared "Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone Commemoration Day" within the City of Chicago. The City
shall sponsor an appropriate observation annually on this date. This annual observation shall include a report by the Mayor on the City's activities to enforce this ordinance.
202.6 Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Signs
The City shall post and maintain appropriate signs at recognized entrances to the City and in City Hall proclaiming the City of Chicago's
status as a nuclear weapon free zone. When posted on City streets or on
state or federally supported roads entering the City of Chicago, such
signs shall conform with the standards set forth in Section 28-44 of the
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Federal Highway Administration's "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices for Streets and Highways."
202.7 Enforcement
Each violation of this ordinance shall be punishable by up to 30 days
imprisonment and a $1,000.00 fine. Each day of violation shall be
deemed a separate violation.
202.8 Severability
If any section, sub-section, paragraph, sentence or word of this ordinance shall be held to be invalid, either on its face or as applied, the
invalidity of such provision shall not affect the other sections, sub-sections, paragraphs, sentences or words of this ordinance, and the applications thereof; and to that end the sections, sub-sections, paragraphs,
sentences or words of this ordinance shall be deemed to be severable.
Section 2. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and
after its date of passage.

